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1966] CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-VoTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965-SUSPENSION OF
LITERACY TESTS AND FEDERAL REGISTRATION.'
In South Carolina v. KatzenbaCh,2 provisions of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act, which suspended tests and devices in determining voter
qualifications in states coming under the coverage formula,3 were up-
held as a valid exercise of congressional power conferred by the Fifteenth
Amendment.4 The suspension of tests was designed to alleviate the
futility of the litigation on a case by case approach embodied in previous
civil rights legislation.5 Precedent enunciated in cases decided prior to
and under the 1957 and 1960 civil rights legislation laid some of the
groundwork for upholding the 1965 Act 6 and quantitative results at-
tained, or the lack of it under them, also promoted its passage.7
The Court was confronted with the propositions that the states may
determine qualifications to vote8 when not circumventing a federally
protected right and that a literacy test in itself is not unconstitutional,9
but, on the other hand, discriminatory application of the tests was sup-
posedly the primary method of preventing qualified Negroes from
voting.10
1. 79 Stat. 437, §§ 4(a-d), 5, 6(b), 7, 9, 13(a) and 14; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a-d), 1973c,
1973d(b), 1973e, 1973g, 1973k(a) and 19731.
2. 86 S. Ct. 803 (1966).
3. Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, 26
Counties in North Carolina and.one County in Arizona were brought under the coverage
formula by appropriate proceedings on August 7, 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897.
4. U. S. CoNsr. amend. XV, §§ 1 and 2:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
5. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Star. 634; Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Star. 86; Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Star. 241.
6. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 2 at 810. See generally, Note, Federal
Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L. Rev. 1051 (1965).
7. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 2 at 811-812. The Court recites the fact
that after four years of litigation in Dallas County, Alabama, Negro registration in-
creased from 156 to 383 out of approximately 15,000 Negroes of voting age.
8. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91 (1965); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,
347 (1960); U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 2 " . . . [Aind the Electors in each State shall have
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature"
9. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 79 (1959).
10. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 2 at 808.
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Several contentions relied upon in contesting the validity of the Act
were readily disposed of by the Court. First, the coverage formula
made the suspension of tests operative only in those states where less
than fifty per cent of the eligible voters were registered on November 1,
1964 or voted in the presidential election of November 1964;" but the
doctrine of equality of states was held applicable only upon the terms
of a state's admission into the Union and not to evils arising subsequent
to admission. 12 Secondly, the determination of the fifty per cent regis-
tration or voting coverage formula by the Attorney General or the
Director of the Census is not subject to judicial review 13 nor is the
certification by the Attorney General that the appointment of examiners
is necessary.14 Arguments against validity were based upon a denial
of due process and that it constituted a bill of attainder. In answer, the
Court held that a state is not a "person" protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 5 and that the Bill of Attainder Clause
of Article 116 along with the principle of separation of powers are re-
garded as protection for individual persons and private groups pe-
culiarly vulnerable to non-judicial determinations of guilt. Further-
more, the states have no standing as parents of its citizens to invoke
these constitutional provisions. 7
Section 5 of the Act 8 provides that if a state or political subdivision,
11. 79 Star. 437, Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4 (b); 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(b). See note
3, supra, for States affected.
12. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 2 at 819; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559 (1911).
13. Supra, note 11:
A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the Director
of the Census under this section or under section 6 or section 13 shall not be
reviewable in any court and shall be effective upon publication in the Federal
Register.
14. Ibid.
15. U. S. CozsT. amend. V:
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....
16. U. S. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 9:
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
17. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 2 at 816; Com. of Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 485-486 (1923); State of Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 19 (1927).
18. 79 Stat. 437, Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5; 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. In effect, the Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia is made a court of general jurisdiction to hear
cases on new voter qualifications imposed by the States covered under the bill. Mr.
Justice Black believes the cases should be heard by the Supreme Court acting under




wherein tests and devices have been suspended, enacts any new voting
qualifications or procedures, they cannot be enforced unless the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia has rendered a de-
claratory judgment finding that enforcement by a state will not have
the effect of denying the right to vote on account of race or color. New
qualifications and procedures may also be enforced if submitted to the
Attorney General and no objection is raised within sixty days of submis-
sion. The contention against the validity of this section was that such
a declaratory judgment was in essence an advisory opinion prohibited
by Article III, Section 2.19 This argument was rejected on the grounds
that all tests were suspended and therefore any law enacted, which im-
posed new qualifications or procedures, created a "case or controversy"
upon its enactment.2 0
After disposition of the foregoing arguments, the question was said
to be narrowed to one of whether Congress has "exercised its powers
under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation
to the States .... ,, 21 The principle applied was:
As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting.22
The Court then proceeded to find that the provisions of the Act under
review were rational means23 to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and
therefore constitutional. Recognizing the unusual nature of portions of
the bill, the justification given was that exceptional conditions warrant
19. U. S. CoNsr. Art. III, § 2;
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases...
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in part, said:
The form of words and the manipulations of presumptions used in § 5 to create
the illusion of a case or controversy should not be allowed to cloud the effect of
that section. (Supra note 2 at 833).
20. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 2 at 822.
21. Id. at 816.
22. Ibid. This principle was formulated from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Vheat.) 316, 421 (1819):
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.
23. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 2 at 823.
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legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.2 4 In all probability, even
more stringent regulations and drastic measures would have been upheld
as a valid exercise of congressional power in light of the conditions
sought to be remedied.
Don L. Ricketts
24. Id. at 822; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Wilson
v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
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